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Technoculture: Risk reporting and analysis at a large airline 
“If they get into the whistle-blower line then they’ve gone too far; you don’t 
need a whistle, we give them a whole orchestra to play with, the whistle’s the 
last thing on our list.” (Senior manager, Safety Department at Airline) 
 
Enterprise risk management frameworks portray risk management as a standardised 
process of risk identification, reporting and control (see IRM/AIRMIC/ALARM, 2002; 
COSO, 2004; ISO, 2009). However, risk identification, reporting and control are multi-
faceted practices: How can individuals understand what qualifies as a risk to be reported 
(Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007; Macrae, 2007a, 2007b)? How can organisations address the 
numerous biases that inhibit the ability to discuss risks and failures (Kaplan & Mikes, 
2012)? What is the right balance between the use of incentive structures that recognize 
financial and legal liability for risk and adoption of ‘no-blame’ cultures (Hood & Jones, 
1996)? What are the consequences of ‘speaking up’ in contexts that are subject to 
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increased demands for public scrutiny (Power, 2007)? And how do executives react to ‘bad 
news’ (Simons, 1999)?  
Organisations often address these issues of risk identification and escalation by prescribing 
structural changes and by adopting new control technologies such as whistleblowing, 
oversight functions, formal values-based controls, reporting and monitoring systems. 
Demands for improvement are also made in terms of ‘softer’ elements such as corporate 
(risk) cultures and ethics (e.g., Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007; Mikes & Kaplan, 2012; Power et 
al., 2013). This chapter explores the relations between control technologies and 
organisational culture and how their mutual interdependence influences the flow of 
information between front-line, staff functions (e.g., risk, compliance, internal audit) and 
top managers. The focus of this chapter can be characterized in terms of the following 
questions: When and how do (and can) people feel free to ‘speak up’ and report risks? 
What kinds of technologies and cultures enable risk reporting and analysis? How does their 
operation define specific ways of working with risk? 
In the spirit of this volume, the chapter does not draw on a specific theoretical lens or body 
of the literature. The chapter rather provides an empirical account of riskwork within the 
Safety Department of a large airline company (hereafter anonymised as Airline). As 
suggested in the initial quote, the Safety Department provides to members of staff ‘a whole 
orchestra’ to play with. Following a brief account of the data collection and research 
methods, the chapter begins by illustrating the practices that constitute such an ‘orchestra’. 
Secondly, it develops the notion of technoculture, which aims to capture the way in which 
a specific notion of corporate culture becomes hard-wired, materialized and operationally 
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expressed by reporting and other managerial systems. Thirdly, the chapter shows how this 
notion of technoculture helps us to understand riskwork by drawing on two vignettes, 
which illustrate how safety data are captured, used and acted upon.  
 
Methods 
The author collected qualitative data from the Safety Department of a major airline 
company, headquartered in the UK and operating a wide range of national and 
international flights
1
. Data was gathered from face-to-face meetings with six members of 
the Safety Department (including the Director, her deputy and four members of staff from 
three distinct teams) and public documents such as corporate reports and media articles. 
Formal interviews were complemented by informal conversations with the Director and 
other members of staff. Interviews with the Director and her deputy were recorded and 
then transcribed, while detailed notes were taken during the other meetings (therefore, 
unless specified otherwise, all quotes in this chapter comes from the two senior managers).  
The headquarters of Airline were visited on two distinct periods of time (May 2013 and 
May 2014), thus providing a tentative sense of the longitudinal development of safety risk 
workstreams. The company visits also included comprehensive exposure to different office 
spaces, including the working environment of senior managers, managers and members of 
staff from different functions (e.g., safety, commercial, engineers etc.), crew rooms and the 
                                                 
1
 Data collection was initially carried out in the context of a broader project on ‘risk culture in financial 
organisations’ (together with Mike Power (LSE) and Simon Ashby (Plymouth Business School)).  
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corporate canteen. Moreover, it was possible to observe the functioning of the safety 
reporting system (with simulated data), a demonstration of the use of smart phone apps to 
access the internal reporting system, as well as a video related to the induction programme 
for new hires. Observation of such elements complemented data collected from interviews 
and documents. As a research strategy, the approach adopted reflects the spirit of calls for 
closer attention to the field in research on ‘(risk) work’ in organisation studies (Barley & 
Kunda, 2001).  
Data collected from the company were also complemented by information obtained 
directly from senior representatives of the UK aviation regulatory agency. Two meetings 
took place in July and October 2014. The conversations focused on the regulation and 
oversight of safety risks within the airline sector. Finally, interview material was 
supplemented by an analysis of publicly available material such as policy documents and 




The notion of just culture was reiterated several times in relation to the work done within 
the Safety Department. This notion has been articulated in prior work on safety and crisis 
management in relation to the way in which organisations handle blame and punishment, 
and how this can influence what gets reported (Reason, 1997; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). 
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Weick and Sutcliffe (2007: 131) describe just culture as “an atmosphere of trust in which 
people are encouraged, even rewarded, for providing essential safety – related information 
– but in which they are clear about where the line must be drawn between acceptable and 
unacceptable behavior.” One interviewee defined just culture in her own way as follows: 
 “Just culture is a culture whereby an individual can make an honest 
mistake or perhaps an omission but where wilful violations are not 
tolerated […] Because you can’t have a no-blame culture whereby I want 
X to tell me if he’s made a mistake and I promise you if you’ve made a 
mistake I won’t do anything, okay […] That is not good in the interests of 
the individual, nor the individual’s colleagues, nor the interests of the 
business; there has to be this idea of justice. And that means that we can 
have a fair hearing.” (Emphasis added) 
 
So the just culture concept recognizes that Airline has responsibility to identify the causal 
factors of a safety event to reduce the risk of recurrence, and also acknowledges that 
human failures can be the root cause of an event. But it also recognizes that if individuals 
operate in line with company’s procedures, training and experience, then the failure will 
not necessarily result in disciplinary sanctions. Just culture is strongly intertwined with 
attitudes to internal reporting that reflect confidence in the possibility of having what 
interviewees called a “fair hearing.” As put by a senior manager: 
 “If it’s been a genuine mistake, if it’s been a genuine omission, okay and 
it’s commensurate with your training and skill level, then we need to learn 
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from it. We might retrain you, we might give you some additional support 
but you fear not.”  
 
Just culture, and its development, is related to organisational culture (interviewees mention 
the famous expression attributed to Edgar Schein: ‘the way we do things around here’), 
and so-called ‘soft’ elements such as ‘energy’ and ‘leadership’, the quality and amount of 
‘dialogue’ between employees and senior management as well as among employees 
themselves. One senior manager often made reference to the formation of a “contract of 
understanding” between the employee, the company and its senior management. Using her 
words, “we want you to report, we need that information to make your environment 
safer … But for you to report you need to understand how we’re going to behave.” The 
description of such a cultural contract echoes discussions of culture as ways of knowing 
and sensemaking. Paraphrasing Schein, the key question is not so much how “we do things 
around here”, but “how we develop expectations around here” (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007: 
119).  
But just culture is also based on physical processes and procedures that contribute to the 
identification of a risk, its reporting as well as understanding whether it’s a “genuine 
mistake” or “a willful negligent act.” In short, the systemic component of just culture 
consists of a number of reporting and monitoring technologies. The following sections 
focus on three such technologies that share a set of commonalities, namely a strong 
emphasis on encouraging internal reporting, the availability of large datasets, and the 








 (SR) system is a web application that is designed to engage all staff 
in safety management and incident reporting. It is a hub for reporting safety issues, which 
is capable of handling various processes such as event investigation, risk assessment and 
analysis, and peer reviews. SR has more than 10,000 users and almost 30,000 reports were 
recorded in the year preceding the research. The purpose of the system is to allow 
personnel to report any safety matters and it is adjusted to the different areas of the 
organizations (e.g., pilots, crew members and other personnel). The underlying philosophy 
is that any and all matters should be reported. As put by a senior manager: 
“So each area of the organisation has a dedicated report form on which 
they can report any safety matters, whether they’re … you know, if I take 
the pilot example, the pilot will use it to report any incidents that occur or 
potential incidents that occur during their operation. He’ll also report it for 
a trip hazard on the way into the office, he’ll also use it if he was 
transferring from one airport to another in a taxi and the taxi driver was 
mad. So you know, they have these dedicated streams that are particular to 
each department.”  
 
                                                 
2
 The name of the application has been modified to maintain anonymity. 
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Figure 7.1 provides an overview of the application functionalities and reporting process. 
All investigations start with an incident report filed by a member of staff (hereafter called 
the reporter). The system has pre-set event descriptors with over 2,000 combinations that 
can be chosen by the person reporting an event, while basic information is already 
automatically inserted (e.g., number of flight, crew members). The bottom half of the 
screen visualized by the reporter asks for details about the event type, which can be very 
granular. Let’s suppose that a bird has hit the airplane. Crew members can access the 
reporting system remotely, where some details are already inserted (e.g., crew details). The 
reporter inserts information about the event type. Further questions will be selected by the 
system based on the input already given: for instance, the part of the plane that was struck, 
type of bird, estimated number of birds. The reporter can highlight if some information 
should be treated as confidential in case further investigation arises. The reporter can also 
use a red flag process to alert management to a potential safety risk that needs attention. 
The management then decides if the red flag warrants immediate attention. 
Figure 7.1 here 
The report can be closed immediately depending on the investigator’s judgement about the 
relevance of the risk event. Alternatively the investigation can take more or less time 
depending on each case. In some cases explanatory reports can take several months as the 
investigators need to seek out help with operations, engineers and other functional experts. 
Indeed, requests for peer reviews are frequent. Information from experts is collected, 
stored and can be retrieved as needed in specific boxes within the system. The final report 
is sent out to various recipients who have been involved with the investigation. The 
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investigator can decide which parts of the report to disclose, who can receive the report, 
and which sections she would be able to see. If recommendations are raised by 
investigators, the reporter or other staff involved need to upload evidence that something 
has been done or the reasons why the recommendations were rejected. 
Various reports can be flexibly created and published based on different parts of the 
investigation (e.g., descriptors, recommendations, actions, risk values etc.). The system 
also provides a platform to interact with regulators. Investigators can do a print screen of 
different parts of the investigation and hand this material to the regulators. As put by one 
investigator: “we just tell them, have a look yourself!”. The reports can be used as factual 
evidence that something is a recurring problem in a specific context (e.g., a ‘bad’ airport), 
and may require regulatory attention.  
 
Flight Data Monitoring 
Pilots’ performance is also monitored in real time through a Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) 
system. According to one member of the monitoring team, FM aims to provide a “non-
punitive environment” to analyse data from black boxes. The investigations are carried out 
at central offices by a team of four people, all of whom had been flying pilots in the past, 
an element that helps to add “content and background” to the data analysis. As put by a 
member of the team, “otherwise we would not have credibility” in conversations with 
flying pilots.  
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The analysis can be triggered by a pilot asking for it, by a safety report being filed, or by 
the monitoring team directly. Even if a pilot is not asking for it, the flight management 
team should be able to start an investigation anyway. As put by one member of the team, 
“the pilot needs to file a report if there is a reportable event”, but the team revising the data 
“would be able to pick up an anomaly anyway.” FM is described as being not “malicious” 
in intent, but the data basically enables the reconstruction of all the actions that have been 
taken by a pilot. Using the words of a member of the monitoring team, the system allows 
them to “see if the pilot has done the right thing, for example in case of TCAS3 if he was 
told to go down, did he actually go down?”  
The key skill according to the monitoring team’s members is related to data analysis. For 
example, an investigation can relate to turbulence that is considered excessive. The 
monitoring team examines the data, which can be presented in different forms such as a 
spreadsheet or 3D visualisations of the plane movement. If the problem cannot be figured 
out directly by the monitoring team, then the data is transferred to engineers. The opinion 
of engineers is normally sought anyway on the final document. The amount of information 
is significant, and a good investigator should be able to pick up the pieces of information 
that enable an explanation of the problem that has occurred, even if this information is not 
the most visible. 
 
                                                 
3
 Traffic Collision Avoidance System monitors the airspace around an aircraft for other aircraft equipped 
with a corresponding active transponder, and warns pilots of the presence of other aircraft which may present 
a threat of collision. 
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Fatigue Risk Management 
The company has also developed a reporting process around fatigue issues, which since the 
early 2000s have been an increasingly prominent part of operational risk (e.g., including 
high risk events such as micro-sleep during critical phases of a flight). Fatigue Risk 
Management (FRM) is defined as a data-driven means of monitoring and managing 
fatigue-related safety risks to make sure that personnel are performing at an adequate level 
of alertness. Although there are regulations for fatigue risk management, an interviewee 
stated that “the boundaries are thin … there are a number of things that can be done within 
or outside the rules.” For instance, a 12-hour break can be interpreted flexibly as it can be 
taken at any time: “but it is not the same 12 hours at night and 12 hours in the middle of 
the day.” Therefore, as illustrated by one senior manager, “what [the airline] did then was 
to challenge the regulator on the basis of academically-accredited procedures and 
processes to say look, we think we can do this differently.” 
The fatigue risk management system consists of several different components: a fatigue 
risk management policy; a crew fatigue reporting mechanism with associated feedback; 
procedures and measures for assessing and monitoring fatigue levels; procedures for 
investigating, and recording incidents that are attributable wholly or in part to fatigue; 
processes for evaluating information on fatigue levels and fatigue-related incidents, 
undertaking interventions, and evaluating the effects of those interventions; awareness 
training programmes; and, finally, a performance audit plan. Once again, internal reporting 
is the key trigger for fatigue-related investigations. The data is based on detailed reports 
filed by pilots and crew members (around 6,000 reports in the year preceding my research) 
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which include elements such as details of current duty, previous duties, flying hours, night 
stops away from base, commute times, sickness records and other so-called ‘hassle’ 
factors. 
FRM team members see themselves as internal consultants and produce “a huge amount of 
reporting every month” that aims to help decision-making, including commercially-
sensitive issues such as flight scheduling. As in SR and FM described above, the team 
aimed to encourage a reporting culture around fatigue risks. The availability of large 
samples of data was seen as crucial to identify specific stress points, such as certain 
airports that are at the centre of many routes and therefore can cause more problems with 
assembling crews. The FRM team analyses the data and tries to find the root causes, often 
through predictive models with the help of SR information. In contrast to other safety 
teams, most of the FRM team members do not have a background as flying pilots; “being 
good with numbers” is instead the key skill required.  
 
Technoculture 
The four discrete but related safety practices of Airline suggest a specific view of the 
relation between culture and control technologies, summarised by the motif of 
technoculture. Far from being a fully developed concept, technoculture may be useful in 
moving forward the theoretical and empirical study of how, where and when risk 
management work takes place.   Of course, ‘technology’ and ‘culture’ are topics that have 
been researched extensively in different ways and it would be over-ambitious to argue that 
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a new compound word is self-evidently descriptive. In fact, the analytical distinction 
between culture and technology can be challenged in the first place. On the one hand, an 
organisation can be seen as being a culture as opposed to having a culture (Alvesson, 2002: 
24-29). According to this perspective, culture is not separable from other organisational 
properties, including technology. Rather, it permeates the entire organisation and is 
reproduced in formal structures, administrative processes, strategic plans and other, 
apparently technical, tasks and results-oriented activities. On the other hand, technology 
can be seen as a social product, rather than having a social impact once it is produced 
(Bijker et al., 1987). If one looks closely at those who work with technology (e.g., 
engineers), technical, economic, scientific, social and political considerations are 
intertwined right from the start of technology development (Callon, 1987). Apparently 
‘technical’ phenomena are neither isolated nor static; they are characterised by dynamic 
socio-technical networks that can vary in terms of size and complexity, including multiple 
and various human and non-human components
4
 (Hilgartner, 1992). 
Empirical studies have also shown how culture and technology are entangled with one 
another. It is possible to provide three examples where, similar to Airline, technology 
refers not only to complex operations, but also to technologies of control such as rules that 
guide decisions about risks, work practices, procedural and hardware surveillance systems. 
The ethnographic study carried out by Kunda (1992) in a US high-tech corporation (called 
‘Tech’) shows how corporate culture itself can be a technology of control. Multiple 
                                                 
4
 Hilgartner (1992) uses the example of auto-based transport, which includes entities that have physical 
existence such as tires and engines, human subjects such as drivers and regulators, and also less tangible 
elements such as traffic laws. 
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communication circuits constantly promoted Tech’s ‘way of doing things’, defining not 
only required work behaviour but also rules for thoughts and feelings. The historical 
ethnographic analysis carried out by Vaughan (1996) on the Challenger disaster shows 
how the experimental character of the shuttle technology coupled with group-based risk 
assessment processes, ad-hoc hardware surveillance and measurement systems and 
standardised rules for decision-making across the organisation resulted in a cultural 
tendency to normalise technical anomalies (e.g., ‘flying with flaws’ at NASA). Finally, the 
study carried out by Macrae (2007a; 2007b) on the work of safety experts in the UK 
aviation sector suggests that the sheer complexity of airline operations together with an 
appreciation of the limits of incident reporting technologies contributed to the development 
of a distinct analytical culture characterised by scepticism, humility and caution. Safety 
people considered risk assessments to be the product of limited, and most likely flawed, 
knowledge and therefore continually open to change. 
In line with studies such as these, the concept of technoculture demands that we avoid a 
dualism of technology and culture and that we explore the practices where they are 
entangled with one another. It suggests that neither culture nor technology are distinct 
features of the context in which safety experts work, but they are manifested and co-
produced in specific places and times. Specifically, in this chapter, the expression 
technoculture is invoked to identify and explore three coterminous features that 
characterise the entanglement of technology and culture in Airline: 1) the hard-wiring of 
cultural values of safety into systems, processes and other visible artifacts; 2) the 
expansion of certain types of working interactions supported by reporting and monitoring 
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technologies; 3) the adoption of a business partnering approach by safety experts to build 
respect for safety values, people and technologies.  
 
Hard-wiring culture 
The just culture narrative is expressed in two mutually supportive pillars: on the one hand, 
a “cultural contract” between senior management and employees; on the other hand, 
processes and systems. The practical functioning of safety practices suggests that just 
culture does not float around in a set of principles or corporate values; it gets hard-wired 
into control technologies. Reporting and monitoring systems embody the ambivalence of 
just culture that promotes an atmosphere of trust, in which people are encouraged to 
provide essential risk information that is not blame-less. SR, for instance, is a highly 
forensic system that does “not allow any corners to hide.” Staff members do not need to be 
‘good’; by and large, they are made ‘good’ by reporting and monitoring systems as the 
problems they report are likely to be picked up by the technology anyway. As put by one 
interviewee: 
 “And the way we do that is through two things; positive encouragement 
and leverage. And the leverage comes from the system and the system is 
geared […] I liken it to a room with no corners … you cannot hide 
anywhere because there isn’t a corner to hide in because the system drives 
that and it’s auditable.” (Emphasis added) 
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Technologies of control such as SR, FM and FRM are not intended to be “malicious” tools 
(a term used by a member of the flight data monitoring team) but rather should provide a 
non-punitive environment that encourages the reporting of any kind of issue. And yet, 
lurking in the background is the idea that issues will be picked up anyway through the 
system. As expressed by a senior manager in relation to the influence of technologies on 
just culture: “from the pilot’s point of view, they know everything’s being watched, so that 
also in a subtle way helps them be honest.” 
But senior managers stressed the difficulty to achieve control over individual actions 
through the use of monitoring technologies, incident reporting and investigation systems 
only. Just culture is also based on other ‘soft’ elements, including visible and sustained 
management attention to safety issues, which are the equivalent of the hard-wired flight 
data monitoring system put in place on the aircraft. These ‘soft’ elements can be materially 
traced in the organisation, similar to the symbols, rituals and other artefacts that are often 
associated to notions of corporate culture (Schein, 2004), and belief control systems 
(Simons, 1995). Interviewees continuously expressed the need for ‘energy’ and ‘alchemy’ 
on top of ‘systems’ by using metaphors and symbols that were cascaded down throughout 
the organisation. For instance, the need for a full understanding of just culture from 
employees and regulators was explained through the use of examples that referred to 
academic research in anthropology
5
. Corporate presentations (both public and internal) 
                                                 
5
 An example is related to the experience of indigenous people in Oceania, who witnessed the landing of 
planes and subsequently reproduced a rudimental airport waiting for airplanes to come and land. These 
people did not have a full understanding of how the airport/airplane system worked, although their attempt to 
reproduce the various components of an airport (e.g., runway, landing lights, control tower) was remarkable. 
In a similar way, a company would fail in safety management if people simply comply with the components 
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referred to symbols, graphs and diagrams elaborated in academic research (in particular by 




To summarise, just culture is hard-wired in a network of heterogeneous elements, ranging 
from monitoring systems to diagrams and metaphors. Each element is important, but it is 
their juxtaposition that makes just culture workable. Having either soft elements or 
monitoring systems only would not provide sufficient leverage, considering the complexity 
of operations and the variety of organisational roles (e.g., pilots, crew, non-flying members 
of staff). As put by a senior manager, when prompted to reflect on whether softer elements 
were superfluous in the presence of pervasive monitoring systems, “I like to picture it as 
the image on the US dollar bill, you have the all seeing eye at the top of the pyramid 
looking into the organisation, more a case of big ‘brothers’ watching you, the eye (soft 
elements) and flight data monitoring (technology)
7.”  
 
Interacting via technology 
A second characterising element that emerges from Airline’s safety practices relates to the 
interactive control style that they promote. Control technologies of Airline are designed to 
                                                                                                                                                    
of a safety management system without a full understanding of how these components add up to form a safe 
working environment. 
6 
For example, it was possible to observe the use of the production vs. protection diagram, which shows how 
the degree of protective measures must match the hazards of the productive operations; and the use of the so-
called Swiss Cheese model, which shows how risks can be mitigated by multiple types of defenses which are 
‘layered’ behind each other (see Reason, 1997). 
7
 Email communication – November 2014. 
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encourage interactions. This emphasis starts from the very broad approach taken to 
encourage the reporting of events by not imposing a materiality threshold. As put by a 
senior safety manager: 
“Well the risk is as soon as you start trying to define what people should 
report and should not report they won’t bother. So you’re best to get them 
to report everything and then get clever how you sort out the chaff from 
the wheat … So we just say you know, just report everything.” 
SR’s investigators suggested an increasing willingness to engage with the system, and 
certainly an increase in the usage of the system in the last 6 months. The firm that designed 
the system stated that Airline witnessed an increase by more than 50% in incident reporting 
within a very short time of SR being deployed. As put by a senior manager, a crucial 
aspect of their job is “to make it really easy for [employees] to report.” For this reason, 
staff can log into the SR system from almost anywhere
8
. Moreover, once a report is filed in 
the system, the SR application is designed to make it easier for investigators to ask their 
peers and experts to comment on or review their investigations and subsequently provide 
tailored feedback to the reporter.  
But the interactive nature of safety work in Airline is not of interest simply because people 
are encouraged to report as much as possible. The technoculture of such interactive style 
can be related to three specific features. First, the reporting technologies encourage an 
expanded view of the issues being reported, encompassing all sorts of seemingly minor 
                                                 
8
 At the time of the second field visit in May 2014, the company was testing an app that will allow access to 
the system from people’s personal devices.  
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things and maintaining open for investigation a multiplicity of risk objects (Hilgartner, 
1992). As put by a senior manager: 
“So the safety reports tell us what the reporter observed or thought 
happened and might get a bit about why they thought it happened and we 
try and verify that through the investigation process. Flight data 
monitoring will tell you exactly what the aeroplane did but not why. 
Electronic training reports will tell you how a large group of people are 
likely to behave in a given non-normal situation. This will tell you about 
the reliability of equipment and there’s a whole bunch of other stuff here, 
on-time performance, fuel, all components of that picture.” 
The initial piece of information travels from the actual place of an incident and is placed 
into a network of relations between elements that come from many other places, from 
distant materials and faraway actors. A wide range of objects, besides senior managers and 
subordinates, safety and non-safety people, contribute to make control technologies 
interactive, stimulating reflections and raising further questions on a specific incident case. 
These elements not only contribute to form a more comprehensive view of what and why 
something happened. But they are also potentially transformed as part of an emerging 
socio-technical network around a specific safety issue (Hilgartner, 1992). Drawing on the 
previous quote, electronic training reports help to explain flight data monitoring 
information, which in turn add context to the reporter’s perceptions of an event.  
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Second, the technology is designed to expand functionalities and working interactions. The 
technology is a vehicle for different types of touch points that occur between safety 
personnel and the rest of the organisation. But the nature of these interactions, though 
varied, has a specific common logic. SR is a forensic system, where everything done can 
be traced and where audit trails are preserved (i.e., the investigator can print different 
forms at different stages of the inquiry). The web-based application allows for the tracking 
of the report to the point of delivery, and is constantly verifying the robustness of the audit 
trail generated by each investigation. In so doing, the application is also disciplinary in the 
sense that it controls the workflow timings, for example with notifications on late 
responses approaching deadlines (although it also allows due dates to be re-set as needed 
and request date extensions).  
Third, interactions are frequent and mediated by reporting technology. This observation 
provides a counterpoint to previous research on management control systems and safety 
experts’ work. Well-known research on interactively-used control systems (e.g., Simons, 
1995) emphasises the importance of the big ‘strategic’ uncertainties that require face-to-
face time in regular meetings between senior managers and subordinates. Interviews and 
direct observation at Airline show instead frequent interactions, which are mediated by the 
reporting technologies and are sustained by a relentless interest in small, and possibly 
trivial, things and massive archiving systems. Moreover, prior work on safety in the airline 
industry (e.g., Macrae, 2007a, 2007b) emphasises the relevance of participative networks 
to cope with the perceived incompleteness of incident reporting data; investigators act as 
‘coordinating hubs’ by informing others about signs of potential risks, requesting reviews 
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and other information from specialists, and also forming temporary and distributed teams 
of experts. In Airline, the reporting technology seems to operate as a key ‘coordinating 
hub’, with a great deal of interaction which is not face-to-face, but enabled and mediated 
by technologies such as the SR system. 
To summarise, just culture is hard-wired in a network of heterogeneous elements, which is 
a vehicle for different types of touch points and an expanded view of the issue being 
reported initially. Interaction is encouraged (i.e., easy access to reporting technology, 
absence of a materiality threshold), but mediated by reporting and monitoring technologies 
that contribute to control workflow timings and preserve an audit trail of what is being 
done. In such context, what is the role of safety experts? This question will be addressed in 
the next section. 
 
Business partnering 
The way in which organisational actors answer questions related to the area of 
responsibility of functional experts (risk managers in particular), and their position within 
the organisation structure, has cultural implications, reflecting different values, norms and 
assumptions around the way in which an organisation sees and acts on risks (Power et al., 
2013). Prior literature has explored the changing role of the risk manager in organisations 
(see Power, 2007; Mikes, 2009, 2011; Hall et al., 2015). On the one hand, risk managers 
can be technical experts of a sub-discipline of risk management (e.g., financial, safety, 
information technology risks). On the other hand, especially with the rise of a holistic 
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conception of risk and risk management, risk managers can be seen as change facilitators 
and business partners. In the latter case, what matters are relational skills rather than 
‘technical’ and abstract bodies of risk management knowledge.  
In fact, the way in which such a business partnering role is exercised by functional experts 
such as risk managers is a phenomenon that awaits further research and critical assessment 
(see Mikes in this volume). In Airline, the hard-wiring of culture in control technologies 
and the expansion of working interactions via technology are interrelated with one aspect 
of business partnering: the ambition to build up respect for safety people and technologies. 
This ambition can be traced in two interrelated characteristics of the way in which 
personnel of the Safety Department work. 
First, the personal background of safety staff is strongly related to the company’s 
operations. There was a need to add what was called “content and background” to analyse 
the safety data and to participate in business decisions. Business knowledge was a 
precondition for interaction with front-line and other staff functions in order to: understand 
which language to adopt for enhancing authority and credibility; become trusted business 
advisers; understand the outputs of reporting technologies. A range of informal techniques 
were used by the Safety Department in order to build respect and trust. Many of these 
involved facilitating peer-to-peer communication capability and providing a safe 
environment for people to act naturally and ‘speak up’ if there are problems. An example is 
provided in the following quote: 
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“We do things such as line orientated safety audits and we put a trained 
person on the jump seat of the aircraft, he’s not a training captain, he’s not 
a manager, he’s just one of their colleagues but we train him in 
observation. And they observe the flights against a threat in aero-
taxonomy and we get a huge amount of information from that because 
what we’re trying to do is observe the most natural behaviour we can of 
that pilot. As soon as we put a manager in there or a training captain, 
you’re going to get their best behaviour. You put their mate in there and 
you’re more likely to get the nearest you can to what’s happening day in, 
day out.” (Emphasis added) 
 
Second, safety personnel developed success stories about occasions where decisions 
supported by the Safety Department added value to the company. The precautionary logic 
of safety (e.g., to avoid people getting hurt) is intertwined with narratives of value creation 
and ‘win-win’ situations in terms of safety, costs and business development. Stories of 
value creation are also based on the development of monitoring and reporting technologies. 
The design and implementation of the SR system is itself framed as a profitable investment 
for the company, besides the obvious benefits related to data collection and analysis. 
Instead of buying a product on the market, the decision was made to build the technology 
in partnership with a company working on mobile and web-based safety and compliance 
services. As put by one senior manager: 
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“So we decided what we had to do is to build our own system and so then 
we went back out to the market and said ‘We want to build this system, 
who can help us?’ And we found one company that said ‘Oh yeah, we get 
it’ and bothered to listen, a company called [name omitted] and so 
basically we entered a partnership with them whereby we provide the 
intellectual property around the design and they build the system. They 
then go off and sell the system to everybody and we get some of the 
royalties back.” 
This decision, according to senior managers, was characterised by “lots of wins.” Besides 
benefits in terms of cost and design customisation, supplier risk was also decreased and 
discounts were obtained from an insurance perspective since, as put by one senior 
manager, “you’re continuing to demonstrate risk management and giving them 
confidence.”  
 
Technoculture and riskwork 
As suggested in the introduction to this volume, the motif of riskwork encourages a focus 
on situationally-specific forms of work. In line with this perspective, in this section I 
sketch two vignettes that aim to capture just culture in practice and the deeply intertwined 
relationship between culture and control technology. The vignettes provide short 
descriptions of situations (e.g., landing airplanes, opening doors,) in which safety data 
were used to change current practices and behaviour. In line with the riskwork emphasis on 
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work and ‘normal’ operations in risk management (see Power in this volume; Bourrier, 
2002), the focus is on how members of Airline worked to change their and their 
colleagues’ visions and cognitive maps in order to improve daily situations.  
 
On landing airplanes 
Flight data monitoring data show landings outside the normal parameters. Is that 
risky? This really depends on the airport where the airplane has landed. The data 
shows that it’s happening primarily in the summer in very long runways. It is 
likely that people are doing visual approaches as opposed to longwinded 
instrument approaches. There can be economical benefits and positive 
performance effects (e.g., reduced transfer time to the terminal buildings). There 
is no immediate risk. But there is a latent risk that people get used to that 
behaviour. And, after a number of long landings, the model for a long runway 
may be unconsciously applied to a short runway. That is a problem. Behaviour 
has to be modified. Flight monitoring data people were taking photographs of 
Google satellite images and were overlaying on top of that the actual touchdown 
point on the runway where the aircraft was, and then sending this directly to the 
crew, saying: “how do you feel about it?” 
This vignette reveals elements of the three features of technoculture sketched in the 
previous sections. First, the safety control and reporting technologies contribute to 
identifying the issue even in the absence of self-reporting. This is important as in complex 
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organizations such as airlines risks are rarely self-evident (Macrae, 2007a). In fact, under 
certain conditions, a long landing may not be seen as a problem; on the contrary, it may 
have some beneficial consequences. As shown in the vignette, the risk materializes only 
under certain conditions (e.g., a short runway!). Yet there is a latent risk that the ‘long 
landing’ approach becomes the norm, and therefore is applied in the wrong context. As put 
by one interviewee, “ideally what you want to do is, as that risk starts to emerge in the 
corner, you want to be able to go and address it before it materialises into something 
uncomfortable.” 
Second, the vignette shows how an incident investigation is constituted by a number of 
different elements that come from many different places. Interactions are premised on 
capturing as much data as possible to extract patterns, trending and correlations and 
understand what may become a norm, constituting a threat to flight safety. As put by one 
interviewee, the key aspect is the “process of bringing context in all the time”, by using 
data and interacting with front-line people and other functional experts. The reporting or 
identification of a long landing is only one component of a much larger information set 
that informs interactions between safety people and their colleagues. Triangulating 
different sources of data and analyzing trends helps to understand where long landings are 
happening and to formulate assumptions about the underlying rationales (e.g., good 
weather, panoramic approaches to landing, fuel savings, etc.). Although there is an audit 
trail of the evidence being analyzed, the investigation is not necessarily punitive, but aims 
to understand behaviour that may incorporate latent risks. Data-supported interaction helps 
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to make clear why an issue such as long landing is important and needs to be addressed 
even if, in the first instance, it is not perceived as a risk.  
Third, corrective actions suggest a business partnering approach that emphasise “mate-to-
mate” conversations with the help of visual aids. Senior managers acknowledge that it 
would be easy to put a safety note out recommending to avoid bad behaviour. But the same 
message can be conveyed with “a sense of humor” not to shame people but making it 
obvious that there is something wrong with long landings. As put by one interviewee: “It’s 
not bossy, it’s facilitative thinking you know, you’re helping … you’re taking people with 
you on a journey, this is the preferred modus operandi.”  
In addition to communication methods and ‘attention-grabbers’ such as the above, the 
Safety Department relies on a network of liaison officers. Their goal is to facilitate peer-to-
peer communication and increase the number and quality of touch points between safety 
and the front-line personnel. One senior manager said that “their job is to … give people 
feedback as peer-to-peer, in confidence, to improve performance.” Interestingly, similar to 
technologies of control such as flight data monitoring, liaison officers can be seen as a 
means to penetrate the daily working practices of crew members. But they are also a way 
to enhance confidence and trust in safety workers: in short, to build respect for the Safety 
Department.  
 
On opening doors 
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The doors of an aircraft have automatic escape slides so that if you open them in 
an emergency the slide automatically inflates. These automatic slides need to be 
disarmed when embarking passengers normally. If this is not done, there is a 
safety risk because if someone is standing on the steps and one of these slides 
explodes, it can hit the person with harmful consequences. A specialist was 
asked to break down the current task (the opening of the door under normal 
conditions) and understand why the safety risk may occur. The specialist and his 
support team designed a new task. The investment in having that specialist in to 
work on the task design was about £10,000. But every time the problem had 
occurred in the past, the company had to throw away the slide and buy a new 
one.  
The safety risk illustrated in the vignette is perhaps more evident than the preceding one. If 
a problem occurs, then it is likely that someone has been injured and, at least, a material 
loss has happened. In line with the chapter’s motif of technoculture, this vignette shows 
how the reporting of safety events is only the starting point for a learning process which is 
premised on a relentless interest in data collection and analysis.  
The reporting system showed that this problem had been occurring at Airline, although at a 
lower rate compared to the industry average. In this specific case, available data suggested 
a cyclical pattern. The occurrence of the problem decreased following a change in the 
procedure, but then tended to rise again for various reasons such as the intake of new hires. 
As in the previous vignette, the collection of data on the single ‘fact’ (problems with the 
opening of a door on flight X at airport Y on date Z) coexists with an aspiration to 
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understand its underlying causes. Different sources of information are juxtaposed (e.g., 
incident reporting, new hires); interactions with colleagues from different functions take 
place, and external specialists are consulted. 
The disciplinary element of technology (e.g., “has someone made a willful mistake?”) is 
only one part of the story. Learning from the data is also crucial. In fact, the remedial 
actions are informed by a recognition of human fallibility. The company draws on a 
“hierarchy of effectiveness” of safety measures, which ranges from redesigning a 
component (e.g., the door) to increasing awareness via communication campaigns. The 
benefits, costs and uncertainty of alternative measures are taken into consideration: for 
instance, the redesign of a door is a massive cost, has large potential benefits, but also 
uncertainty as the problem may occur even with the redesigned door. As put by an 
interviewee: “So right at the top is the design … Right at the bottom is a notice to crew to 
say ‘Don’t forget to check you’ve disarmed the doors before opening them’ and that’s 
almost useless.” 
Compared to the previous case, this vignette specifically illustrates the way in which an 
issue gets traction and is acted upon. Two elements emerge. The first involves a risk-based 
rationale. The company has hundreds of flights in a day, and the four doors of the airplane 
are opened twice per flight. Being a very routine job, even in the context of very low 
probability for the event to occur, the exposure is significant. The second element is related 
to the way in which safety experts can expand their organisational footprint. A general 
problem for functional experts such as risk managers is to justify the value of their 
recommendations (see Power, 2007; Power et al., 2013; Hall et al., 2015). The vignette 
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suggests an explicit cost-benefit analysis related to the intervention recommended by the 
Safety Department. As put by one interviewee: 
 “And the investment we made in having that person in to help us was 
probably about £10,000 but every time we blow a slide we have to throw it 
away and buy a new one. So we will have reaped the safety benefit and the 
direct cost and had less on-time performance impacts as a consequence 
because we’re not having to wait for a new slide to be shipped in. So it’s a 
win-win all round.” 
On this basis, this vignette reinforces the view that the partnering role of safety experts is 
not only based on relational skills, ‘attention-grabbers’, and liaison figures. It is also about 
developing a narrative of value-effectiveness through straightforward success stories. As 
put by one interviewee: 
“And if you’re thinking about you know, the upside of that in terms of the 
business, well my example absolutely demonstrates the safety benefit, the 
direct cost benefit, the operational efficiency benefit and that’s what we’re 
trying to do in this big programme. But it all fits in with this concept of a 
safety culture and learning culture and supporting culture and nurturing 






In this chapter, I explored how technology and culture are co-produced and characterize 
specific kinds of riskwork in the aviation sector, namely efforts to promote ‘speaking up’ 
via risk reporting systems and subsequent analysis. The material collected from the Safety 
Department of a large airline company draws attention to the way in which a narrative is 
developed around the concept of just culture and how such narrative is intertwined with 
control technologies.  
The co-production of technology and culture is captured through the motif of 
technoculture, which expresses three themes: the hard-wiring of just culture into control 
technologies; the technology-supported expansion of working interactions; and business 
partnering to build respect for safety values, people and technologies. Two vignettes 
related to routine events, such as landing airplanes and opening doors, add color to the 
features of riskwork as technoculture. Specifically, we see the “no corners to hide” 
dimension of just culture, but also its aspiration for a learning culture supported by 
granular data collection and analysis; we see the emergence of new, more or less 
cooperative, interactions across internal functions but also with external actors; we also see 
the development of narratives that reinforce the value-added role of the Safety Department, 
as well as ‘attention-grabbers’ and new communication lines in action. 
This chapter started with a set of questions that stressed how risk reporting and analysis are 
riddled with ambiguities and contradictions: risks are not self-evident; reporters as well as 
the receivers of information are biased and fallible; there is an inherent tension between the 
need for risk accountability, financial and legal liability for risk, and the ambition to 
encourage risk reporting and ‘speaking up.’ Drawing on the technoculture concept, this 
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chapter suggests that these tensions are addressed in practice by dynamic networks of 
heterogeneous elements, which stimulate and mediate interactions among safety and non-
safety experts. Such socio-technical networks give expression to, rather than suppressing, 
the ambiguities inherent in risk reporting and analysis. There is an encouragement to report 
that is not blame-less; there is help and support from safety personnel, but also pervasive 
monitoring via systems and local networks of liaison officers; there is a focus on flying 
staff, but also recognition of other members of the organisation and their potentially 
relevant role in just culture. Recent uses of the concept of organisational (risk) culture as 
‘the way we do things around here’ stress shared understandings and solutions to common 
problems that can be engineered to achieve optimal solutions (see Power et al., 2013). On 
the contrary, technoculture recognizes, and even nurtures, the plurality of values and 
commitments that characterise riskwork.  
In closing, it is appropriate to make a comment on the process of writing about 
organisational culture. Text about organisational culture like this chapter should be read in 
the context of the author’s situation at the moment in which the text is developed (Kunda, 
1992: Ch. 6; Smircich, 1995; Yanow, 1995). Accordingly it is important to understand that 
Airline was initially conceived as a comparator case in the context of a broader research 
project on risk culture in financial organisations (see Power et al., 2013). The aim was to 
obtain a point of contrast that could stimulate new questions and lines of thought. This 
specific circumstance influenced the shape this chapter and the development of 
technoculture as an organising concept. If the idea of technoculture plausibly describes 
features of practice in the aviation industry, it also provides many points of contrast with 
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the financial sector. Examples of such points of contrast were: the lack of emphasis in 
Airline on formalised models that articulate different responsibilities over risk oversight 
and management; the remarkable degree of openness to the external world and respect for 
external advisers (including academic experts!); the lack of concerns about any dilution or 
capture risks (i.e., ‘going native’ problem); awareness that “context is crucial” and the need 
for having time to reflect as much as to collect and analyse quantitative data.  
So the appeal of technoculture in this chapter is shaped by the points of contrast with 
financial services organisations as much as by the data collected from Airline itself. There 
are certainly limitations to such an approach such as a limited understanding of field level 
practices in the aviation industry. However, data from Airline, and related reflections, helps 
to transform culture from a “tired answer” into an “interesting question” (Smircich, 1995: 
235). This is priceless for researchers confronted with an ever expanding production of 
texts that point to culture as a black-box explanation of last resort, both for the financial 
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